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INTRODUCTION 
This year in review discusses many of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit’s most important 2019 government contract decisions, 
explaining their impact on the overall trajectory of procurement law. In 
2019, as usual, government contracts appeals occupied only a small 
fraction of the Federal Circuit’s docket, which was dominated by 
intellectual property disputes.1 Yet, the few government contract 
decisions the Federal Circuit did issue in 2019 carry great consequence. 
It remains important for procurement practitioners to keep a careful 
eye on the Federal Circuit’s government contracts docket and decisions, 
not only to stay informed of developments in the law but also to 
 
 1. Appeals Filed, by Category, U.S. CT. APPEALS FOR FED. CIR., http://www.cafc. 
uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/the-court/statistics/04_-_Appeal_Filed_by_Category 
_2019_Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/9VSH-2EHC]. 
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understand how the Federal Circuit decides government contracts 
appeals and better anticipate where the law may turn next.2 
I.    DISCUSSION: THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S 2019 GOVERNMENT 
CONTRACTS DECISIONS 
A.   Cost & Pricing 
The Federal Circuit issued two precedential decisions in 2019 
addressing significant issues of government contract cost, pricing, and 
accounting. Raytheon Co. v. Secretary of Defense3 disrupts prior 
understandings of the differences between costs that are unallowable 
and costs that are expressly unallowable.4 Bechtel National, Inc. v. United 
States5 confirms that contractor recovery of litigation settlement costs 
will continue to be governed by the strict rule established by the 
controversial 2009 decision Geren v. Tecom.6 
1. Raytheon: Broadening the scope of expressly unallowable costs 
The Raytheon decision involved the difference between costs that are 
unallowable and costs that are expressly unallowable. By finding that 
certain salary costs “associated with” lobbying were expressly 
unallowable—as opposed to unallowable—the Federal Circuit departed 
from the express definitional distinction between unallowable costs and 
expressly unallowable costs, creating  uncertainty as to how other types 
of unallowable costs will be categorized moving forward.7 
a. Context 
The Federal Acquisition Regulation’s (FAR) Part 31 Cost Principles 
identifies forty-six categories of costs and addresses the extent to which 
those costs are unallowable.8 Although many types of costs may be 
unallowable, a smaller subset of costs are expressly unallowable. The 
government will not reimburse unallowable costs, which must be 
 
 2. See generally The Hon. Jimmie V. Reyna & Nathaniel E. Castellano, Successful 
Advocacy in Government Contracts Appeals Before the Federal Circuit: Context Is Key, 46 PUB. 
CONT. L.J. 209 (2016). 
 3. 940 F.3d 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
 4. Id. at 1310, 1314. 
 5. 929 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
 6. 566 F.3d 1037 (Fed. Cir. 2009); see also Bechtel Nat’l, Inc., 929 F.3d at 1377, 1381. 
 7. See Paul E. Pompeo & Nathaniel E. Castellano, Federal Circuit Disrupts Law of Expressly 
Unallowable Costs, GOV’T CONT. COST, PRICING & ACCT. REP., Dec. 2019, at 1, 1–3. 
 8. See generally 48 C.F.R. pt. 31 (2018). 
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identified and excluded from any billing, claim, or proposal applicable 
to a government contract.9 With respect to expressly unallowable costs, 
however, contractors are further subject to penalty if they submit to the 
government any expressly unallowable cost.10 
Expressly unallowable costs are distinguished from unallowable costs 
by definition. The definition of expressly unallowable costs requires a 
heightened degree of particularity. An expressly unallowable cost is 
defined as a “particular item or type of cost which, under the express 
provisions of an applicable law, regulation, or contract, is specifically 
named and stated to be unallowable.”11 This requirement for heightened 
specificity that a cost is unallowable before it becomes expressly 
unallowable makes sense: it is one thing for the government to limit its 
obligation to reimburse contractors for certain categories of costs, but 
it is a step further to affirmatively penalize a contractor for including a 
specific item of cost in its invoices. 
Raytheon involved certain salary costs associated with lobbying 
activities. Implementing statutory provisions,12 FAR section 31.205-22 
designates as unallowable costs “associated with” various lobbying and 
political activities.13 Affirming the contracting officer’s underlying 
decision, the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA) 
found that the lobbying costs at issue were subject to penalty because 
“[c]osts associated with certain named lobbying activities are stated to 
be unallowable under FAR 31.205-22,” and “they are [thus] expressly 
unallowable.”14 Raytheon appealed. The narrow question presented to 
the Federal Circuit was whether salary costs “associated with” employees 
engaging in lobbying activity qualify as expressly unallowable costs. 
b. The Federal Circuit’s decision 
The Federal Circuit affirmed the ASBCA decision by a unanimous 
opinion authored by Judge Dyk and joined by Judges Linn and 
Taranto.15 Even though FAR 31.205-22 does not expressly name and 
 
 9. See generally 1 KAREN L. MANOS, GOVERNMENT CONTRACT COST & PRICING § 7:12, 
Westlaw (June 2019 update). 
 10. 48 C.F.R. § 42.709-1(a)(1) (2018). 
 11. 48 C.F.R. § 31.0001 (2018) (emphasis added). 
 12. 10 U.S.C. § 2324(e)(B) (2018). 
 13. 48 C.F.R. § 31.205-22(a). 
 14. Raytheon Co., ASBCA No. 57743, 17-1 BCA ¶ 36,724. 
 15. Raytheon Co. v. Sec’y of Def., 940 F.3d 1310, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
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state salary or compensation as unallowable, the Federal Circuit 
nevertheless held that such salary costs are expressly unallowable: 
The definition in FAR § 31.001 of an “expressly unallowable cost” 
refers to “a particular item or type of cost.” These two categories of 
costs confirm that an “expressly unallowable” cost includes more than 
an explicitly stated “item.” Costs unambiguously falling within a 
generic definition of a “type” of unallowable cost are also “expressly 
unallowable.” Here, salaries of in-house lobbyists are a prototypical 
lobbying expense. Subsection 22 disallows “costs associated with” 
activities such as “attempt[ing] to influence . . . legislation . . . through 
communication with any member or employee of the . . . legislature” 
or “attend[ing] . . . legislative sessions or committee hearings.” 
Salaries of corporate personnel involved in lobbying are 
unambiguously “costs associated with” lobbying.16 
In dicta, the Federal Circuit rejected in part prior ASBCA precedent 
that reached the opposite conclusion.17 The Board’s prior decision, 
also involving an appeal by Raytheon, concluded that bonus and 
incentive compensation costs are not expressly unallowable under FAR 
31.205-22 because the costs were not specifically named and stated in 
the cost principle, i.e., the “associated with” language, was not sufficient 
to invoke the standard of expressly unallowable costs and the resultant 
penalty.18 The Federal Circuit was not persuaded: “That decision is not 
binding on this court, and in any event, is contrary to the plain 
language of Subsection 22 to the extent that it concludes that salaries 
in the form of bonus and incentive compensation for lobbying and 
political activities are not ‘expressly unallowable.’”19 
c. Implications 
The Federal Circuit’s decision blurs the definitional distinction 
between unallowable and expressly unallowable costs. Whereas the 
FAR defines expressly unallowable costs as those “specifically named 
and stated to be unallowable,” the Federal Circuit seems to have 
adopted a broader test that encompasses “[c]osts unambiguously falling 
within a generic definition of a ‘type’” deemed unallowable.20 Now, 
instead of asking which types of costs are specifically named and stated 
 
 16. Id. at 1313 (internal citation omitted). 
 17. Id. at 1314. 
 18. Raytheon Co., ASBCA No. 57576, 15-1 BCA ¶ 36043. 
 19. Raytheon, 940 F.3d at 1314. 
 20. Id. at 1312, 1313 (quoting 48 C.F.R. § 31.001 (2018)). 
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as unallowable, contractors and government personnel must discern 
what types of cost unambiguously fall within generic definitions of 
types of unallowable costs. 
The Federal Circuit’s reasoning could impact other cost principles 
that speak in terms of costs “associated with” a particular activity. FAR 
31.205-1, for example, speaks to the allowability of public relations 
activities “associated with areas such as advertising, customer relations, 
etc.”21 FAR 31.205-27 speaks to “expenditures in connection with” 
business organization costs.22 The Federal Circuit’s holding in Raytheon 
should be understood as limited to the issue of lobbying costs under 
FAR 31.205-22; indeed, the Federal Circuit’s conclusion seems 
inherently tied to its understanding of the relationship between 
lobbying and lobbyists: “salaries of in-house lobbyists are a prototypical 
lobbying expense.”23 However, government auditors will likely rely on 
the reasoning of the Raytheon decision to find a broader range of costs 
to be expressly unallowable. 
2. Bechtel: Reaffirming Tecom 
The Bechtel appeal invited the Federal Circuit to cabin and clarify its 
controversial Tecom decision, which established the general 
(government-friendly) rule governing the ability of contractors to 
recover litigation and settlement costs associated with government 
contracts.24 The Federal Circuit, however, declined the invitation to 
cabin Tecom; and to the extent Bechtel clarifies anything, it is that the 
Tecom standard is here to stay. 
a. Context 
Prior to 2009, contractors were often able to recover from the 
government third party litigation costs, including those associated with 
cases involving alleged employment discrimination, which were 
 
 21. 48 C.F.R. § 31.205-1(a)(2) (2018). 
 22. § 31.205-27. 
 23. Raytheon, 940 F.3d at 1313. 
 24. Geren v. Tecom, Inc., 566 F.3d 1037, 1039 (Fed. Cir. 2009). For (critical) 
analysis, see, for example, Steven L. Briggerman, Allowability of Legal Costs: Settlement of 
Third-Party Litigation, 23 NO. 9 NASH & CIBINIC REP. ¶ 50, Sept. 2009, at 1, 4; Richard C. 
Johnson, Beyond Judicial Activism: Federal Circuit Decisions Legislating New Contract 
Requirements, 42 PUB. CONT. L.J. 69, 82–86 (2012); John S. Pachter, The Incredible 
Shrinking Contracting Officer, 39 PUB. CONT. L.J. 705, 736–38 (2010); Edward R. Brown, 
Note, Not a Tecom Party: There’s “Very Little Likelihood” Geren v. Tecom Will Promote 
Sound Government Contracting Practices, 18 GEO. MASON L. REV. 193 (2010). 
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generally viewed as a cost of doing business.25 The Federal Circuit shifted 
that presumption in the 2009 Tecom decision.26 Tecom involved the costs of 
settling and defending a lawsuit alleging employment discrimination 
where the contract at issue incorporated the clause at FAR 52.222-26, 
“Equal Opportunity,” prohibiting employment discrimination.27 The 
Federal Circuit reasoned that because an adverse judgment in the 
employment discrimination lawsuit that the contractor had violated Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 would breach the underlying contract, 
the costs of defending and settling such a lawsuit were unallowable—
unless the contracting officer determined that the Title VII plaintiff had 
“very little likelihood of success on the merits.”28 
The Bechtel case involved allowability of costs associated with two 
discrimination lawsuits brought by former employees on a contract 
that included FAR 52.222-26, “Equal Opportunity.”29 The contracting 
officer reviewed the claims and issued a final decision disallowing the 
contractor’s costs associated with defending the cases, citing Tecom.30 
The contractor appealed, arguing that because the underlying 
contract included a specific Department of Energy Acquisition 
Regulation (DEAR) provision addressing allowability of litigation 
costs, the Tecom standard should not apply. Specifically, Bechtel 
invoked the qualifying language from Tecom suggesting that it only 
applies “where neither the contract nor the FAR dictates the treatment 
 
 25. See, e.g., Gen. Dynamics Corp., ASBCA No. 49372, 02-2 BCA ¶ 30,665 
(“Nevertheless, the expenses incurred by a party in litigation are recognized costs of 
doing business and the cost principles promulgated by the Government over the years 
have uniformly recognized the allowability of contractor legal fees, within certain 
parameters.”); Hirsch Tyler Co., ASBCA No. 20962, 76-2 BCA ¶ 12,075 (“[W]e 
conclude that an ordinarily prudent person in the conduct of competitive business is 
often obliged to defend lawsuits brought by third-parties, some of which are frivolous 
and others of which have merit. In either event, the restraints or requirements 
imposed by generally-accepted sound business practices dictate that, except under the 
most extraordinary circumstances, a prudent businessman would incur legal expenses 
to defend a litigation and that such expenses are of the type generally recognized as 
ordinary and necessary for the conduct of a competitive business.”). 
 26. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 24, at 85. 
 27. Tecom, 566 F.3d at 1039. 
 28. Id. at 1043–46. 
 29. Bechtel Nat’l, Inc. v. United States, 929 F.3d 1375, 1377–79 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
 30. Id. at 1377. 
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of specific costs . . . .”31 Court of Federal Claims Judge Kaplan rejected 
this argument, finding the settlement costs unallowable under Tecom.32 
b. The Federal Circuit’s decision 
Bechtel appealed to the Federal Circuit, arguing primarily that the 
DEAR clause in the contract at issue rendered the Tecom standard 
inapplicable. Bechtel argued that the regulatory history of the DEAR 
clause and the parties’ prior course of conduct showed that the 
Department of Energy (DOE) intended to assume the risk of reimbursing 
costs associated with defending against third party claims.33 Bechtel 
further argued that, in the event the Tecom standard did apply, the Federal 
Circuit should revisit Tecom en banc to clarify the scope of its holding.34 
The Federal Circuit affirmed by a unanimous, precedential opinion 
authored by Judge Dyk (who also authored the majority Tecom 
opinion) and joined by Judges Newman and Shall.35 The Federal Circuit 
did not completely close the door to Bechtel’s theory, acknowledging 
that: “Tecom recognized that the analysis for determining whether the 
costs are allowable could change if there was a contract provision 
‘dictat[ing] the treatment of specific costs.’”36 The Federal Circuit 
concluded, however, that the DEAR provision at issue in this case did not 
qualify.37 The Federal Circuit reasoned that while the DEAR clause 
“generally provides for reimbursement,” it does so only “subject to certain 
exceptions,” including where other provisions of the contract disallow the 
costs in question.38 Because the same FAR clauses at issue in Tecom 
appeared in the DOE contract at issue here, FAR 31.204 and 52.222-26, 
they served to disallow the settlement costs, just as in Tecom.39 
The panel concluded by recognizing that, as a prior precedential 
decision, it is “bound by Tecom” and noted that the contractor “has not 
demonstrated that Tecom is in any way unsound such that the panel should 
recommend en banc review pursuant to Federal Circuit Rule 35.”40 
 
 31. Tecom, 566 F.3d at 1041. 
 32. Bechtel Nat’l, Inc. v. United States, 137 Fed. Cl. 423, 432 (2018). 
 33. Bechtel, 929 F.3d at 1379–81. 
 34. Id. at 1381. 
 35. Id. at 1376–77. 
 36. Id. at 1379 (quoting Tecom, 566 F.3d at 1041). 
 37. Id. at 1379. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 1380 (“DEAR 970.5204-31 does not override the FAR provisions that we 
interpreted in Tecom as disallowing those costs.”). 
 40. Id. at 1381. 
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c. Implications 
Bechtel reaffirms the Tecom standard and arguably narrows the 
potential for contractors to sidestep Tecom by pointing to express 
contract provisions and prior course of dealing indicating an agency’s 
willingness to reimburse litigation expenses associated with defending 
against third party claims. Open issues remain, in particular with respect 
to how explicit a contract provision must be to avoid the Tecom standard. 
The Bechtel decision is not encouraging to those hoping the Federal 
Circuit might reign in Tecom. Unlike Tecom, which was a two-to-one 
decision with a substantial and reasoned dissent from Judge Lourie,41 
Bechtel is unanimous, and the opinion explicitly rejects the need for en 
banc action.42 While the Bechtel panel’s explicit rejection of the need 
for en banc review would not preclude a majority of active Federal 
Circuit judges from voting to revisit Tecom en banc, at least three of the 
twelve active judges would presumably vote against rehearing.43 
Bechtel did not petition for en banc review. 
B.   CDA Jurisdiction: Three Sensible Resolutions, No Surprises 
Many of the Federal Circuit’s most significant and controversial 
government contracts decisions arise in the area of Contract Disputes 
Act (CDA) jurisdiction. In the nearly fifty years since Congress enacted 
the CDA to simplify breach of government contract disputes, the 
Federal Circuit has riddled the CDA with jurisdictional traps that 
disproportionately disadvantage contractor claims, often based on 
trivial noncompliance with vague and unpredictable procedural 
rules.44 Adding insult to injury, it follows clearly from the line of 
 
 41. Geren v. Tecom, Inc., 566 F.3d 1037, 1047 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (Lourie, J., dissenting). 
 42. Bechtel, 929 F.3d at 1381. 
 43. See UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT INTERNAL 
OPERATING PROCEDURES No. 13 (2008), http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/ 
files/IOPs122006.pdf [https://perma.cc/HX3V-J8J9]. 
 44. See Nathaniel E. Castellano, After Arbaugh: Neither Claim Submission, 
Certification, Nor Timely Appeal Are Jurisdictional Prerequisites to Contract Disputes Act 
Litigation, 47 PUB. CONT. L.J. 35, 37 (2017) (“Despite congressional aspirations of 
fairness and efficiency, decades of judicial and administrative interpretations left the 
CDA riddled with unintuitive, subjective, and highly contextual procedural traps for 
the unwary. Worse yet, the Federal Circuit and its predecessor (the U.S. Court of 
Claims) labeled many of these procedural requirements as jurisdictional, allowing for 
extraordinary disruptions to the dispute resolution process.” (footnote omitted)); 
Ralph C. Nash & John Cibinic, The Contract Disputes Act: A Prescription for Wheelspinning, 
4 NASH & CIBINIC REP. ¶ 29, May 1990. 
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decisions beginning with the Supreme Court’s holding in Arbaugh v. Y 
& H Corp.45 that the majority of the CDA’s procedural claim-processing 
requirements carry no jurisdictional status.46 With that context, perhaps 
the Federal Circuit’s 2019 government contracts decisions are worth 
celebrating because the opinions addressing CDA jurisdiction reach 
sensible conclusions, denying the government’s motions to dismiss. 
Better still, DAI Global, LLC v. Administrator of the United States Agency 
for International Development,47 issued in the final days of 2019, provides 
a welcome step in the right direction towards simplifying the CDA’s 
jurisdictional framework, particularly with respect to claim 
certification. And although the DAI Global decision did not directly 
engage with the broader argument that claim certification is not 
jurisdictional, DAI Global does warrant cautious optimism that the 
Federal Circuit may one day realign the CDA with Congress’s clear 
intent and Supreme Court direction by demoting the CDA 
requirements of claim submission, certification, and timely appeal from 
their current, unjustified, jurisdictional status. 
1. DAI Global: Simplifying & relaxing claim certification 
DAI Global properly rejects a line of decisions followed by the Boards of 
Contract Appeals and some Court of Federal Claims judges holding that 
they lack jurisdiction where a certification defect is “non-technical” or 
“the failure properly to certify in the first instance was fraudulent, in bad 
faith, or with reckless or grossly negligent disregard of the requirements 
of the relevant statutes or regulations.”48 The Federal Circuit declined to 
engage with the broader argument that the CDA certification 
requirement is not jurisdictional. The DAI Global opinion, however, 
conspicuously avoids any affirmative statement that the CDA certification 
requirement is jurisdictional. Moreover, several nonprecedential remarks 
from the Federal Circuit suggest the court is skeptical that certification 
retains jurisdictional status following the 1992 CDA amendments. 
Nevertheless, the Boards and some Court of Federal Claims judges treat 
 
 45. 546 U.S. 500 (2006). 
 46. Castellano, supra note 44, at 36 (“Applying the Supreme Court’s new bright-line 
rule to other CDA requirements that have been traditionally classified as jurisdictional, 
this article demonstrates that neither claim submission, certification, nor timely appeal 
requirements are jurisdictional prerequisites to CDA litigation.”). 
 47. 945 F.3d 1196 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
 48. Id. at 1198 (quoting 138 CONG. REC. 21,033, 21,036 (1992)). 
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lack of certification as a jurisdictional defect, continuing the need for the 
Federal Circuit (or Congress) to weigh in. 
a. Context for CDA certification 
The CDA requires that contractor claims seeking more than 
$100,000 must be accompanied by a certification that: (A) “the claim 
is made in good faith”; (B) “the supporting data are accurate and 
complete to the best of the contractor’s knowledge and belief”; (C) 
“the amount requested accurately reflects the contract adjustment for 
which the contractor believes the Federal Government is liable”; and 
(D) the “certifier is authorized to certify the claim on behalf of the 
contractor.”49 FAR 33.207(c) provides exact certification language.50 
Early Federal Circuit precedent labeled the CDA certification 
requirement as a jurisdictional prerequisite and established strict, but 
often unpredictable, standards for certification. The result was a 
consistent flood of motions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction based on 
purportedly inadequate certifications. Litigation of these fact-specific 
procedural motions served to undermine the CDA’s purpose. As 
professors Nash and Cibinic remarked in 1990: 
There have been so many defective certification cases over the years 
that they would make a veritable rogue’s gallery of wasted effort . . . . 
I would guess that this has happened approximately 500 times since 
the CDA was passed . . . . The result is mighty curious for an Act that 
was passed to make the disputes process more efficient—and 
certainly reveals a serious flaw in the CDA.51 
Reflecting on her tenure at the Armed Services Board of Contract 
Appeals, the Honorable Ruth C. Burg addressed the impact of 
certification-related motions: 
This plethora of motions was extremely frustrating since it impacted 
not only a particular case where, if the certification was invalid, the 
matter had to start all over, but also the entire docket. I still relive 
the feeling of futility I felt every time a motion to dismiss for failure 
to certify was submitted for one of the cases before me.52 
This inefficiency (and countless unjust outcomes) led Congress to 
attempt a legislative remedy through the Federal Courts Administration 
 
 49. 41 U.S.C. § 7103(b)(1) (2012). 
 50. 48 C.F.R. § 33.207(c) (2018). 
 51. See Nash & Cibinic, supra note 44. 
 52. The Hon. Ruth C. Burg, The Role of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in 
Government Contract Disputes: A Historic View from the Bench, 42 PUB. CONT. L.J. 173, 175 (2012). 
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Act of 1992,53 which: (1) clarified who could certify a claim, (2) 
provided that the contracting officer had no obligation to issue a final 
decision on a claim that was not properly certified, and (3) affirmed 
that “[a] defect in the certification of a claim shall not deprive a court 
or an agency board of contract appeals of jurisdiction over that claim.”54 
Just before Congress sent the final bill to President Clinton, Senator 
Howell Heflin (its sponsor) explained that the amendment “will 
eliminate the confusion and waste of resources that has resulted from 
the Contract Disputes Act certification being deemed jurisdictional.”55 
The Federal Circuit has not provided a precedential holding as to 
whether failure to certify is still a jurisdictional defect after the 1992 
amendments; however, it has suggested in dicta and nonprecedential 
opinions that failure to certify may not be a jurisdictional issue.56 
Nevertheless, and despite the 1992 amendment’s plain language and 
legislative intent, the Boards of Contract Appeals and several judges of 
the Court of Federal Claims continue to address certification as a 
jurisdictional requirement.57 Often citing FAR provisions and 
unenacted passages of legislative history, these decisions generally 
distinguish between “defective certification” and “failure to certify,” 
the latter of which is still treated as a jurisdictional bar.58 They further 
limited the scope of correctible “defective certifications” to those that 
are “technically defective.”59 Under this line of decisions, a defective 
certification could not be remedied (and therefore destroyed 
jurisdiction) where “the failure properly to certify in the first instance 
 
 53. Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-572, § 907, 106 
Stat. 4506, 4518 (1992) (codified in scattered sections of 18 and 28 U.S.C.). 
 54. Id. 
 55. See 138 CONG. REC. 34,204 (1992). 
 56. See M. Maropakis Carpentry, Inc. v. United States, 609 F.3d 1323, 1329 (Fed. 
Cir. 2010) (“[W]hile technical compliance with certification is not a jurisdictional 
prerequisite to litigation of a contractor’s claim under the CDA, it is a requirement to 
the maintenance of such an action.”); J&E Salvage Co. v. United States, No. 97-5066, 
1998 WL 133265, at *6 n.4 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 25, 1998) (“Pursuant to the Federal Courts 
Administration Act of 1992, proper certification of a CDA claim is no longer a 
jurisdictional requirement.”); James M. Ellett Constr. Co. v. United States, 93 F.3d 
1537, 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“We part ways with the government at its predicate: that 
a proper certification of the settlement proposal was a jurisdictional prerequisite.”). 
 57. See Castellano, supra note 44, at 62–63 & n.192. 
 58. Id. at 62. 
 59. Id. 
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was fraudulent, in bad faith, or with reckless or grossly negligent 
disregard of the requirements of the relevant statutes or regulations.”60 
b. Prior proceedings 
The DAI Global appeal involved several subcontractor claims 
submitted by DAI to the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID) contracting officer. DAI submitted the 
subcontractor claims under a DAI cover letter that was characterized 
as a certification, but the cover letter did not match the FAR’s template 
certification language.61 The contracting officer initially notified DAI 
on July 10, 2017 that she would issue a decision on the claims by August 
24, 2017. However, on “July 19, 2017, 70 days after DAI submitted its 
claims, the contracting officer sent a second letter informing DAI that 
the submission did not contain a contractor certification.”62 
DAI appealed to the Civilian Board of Contracts Appeals. The 
government sought dismissal for lack of jurisdiction due to inadequate 
certification.63 The Board rejected the argument that DAI’s various 
correspondences with USAID qualified as a correctable, technically 
defective certification.64 The Board recited the line of decisions holding 
that “if the certification is made with intentional, reckless, or negligent 
disregard for the applicable certification requirements, it is not 
correctable.”65 After comparing the DAI correspondence with USAID to 
prior decisions, the Board found that DAI’s claim submission was 
“reckless” with respect to certification and “therefore not salvageable.”66 
c. The Federal Circuit’s decision 
DAI appealed to the Federal Circuit, arguing principally that its 
certification was defective, but correctable. More specifically, DAI 
argued that the Board deviated from the plain language of the 1992 
CDA amendment by relying on unenacted legislative history to impose 
 
 60. 138 CONG. REC. 21,033, 21,033 (1992); see Dev. Alternatives, Inc. ex rel. Ersm 
(Afg.) Ltd. v. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., CBCA 5942, CBCA 5943, CBCA 5944, CBCA 
5945, CBCA 5946, 18-1 BCA ¶ 37,147. 
 61. DAI Global, LLC v. Adm’r of the U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., 945 F.3d 1196, 
1197 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 1197–98. 
 65. Dev. Alternatives, Inc., CBCA 5942, CBCA 5943, CBCA 5944, CBCA 5945, CBCA 
5946, 18-1 BCA ¶ 37,147. 
 66. Id. 
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the narrow “technical defect” standard.67 DAI further argued that, in 
light of Supreme Court precedent, the certification requirement is not 
jurisdictional at all.68 
The Federal Circuit reversed and remanded.69 Judge Moore authored 
the unanimous precedential opinion, joined by Judges Schall and 
Taranto.70 The DAI Global decision squarely rejects the line of decisions 
holding that only “technically defective” certification may be corrected: 
Contrary to the Board’s statement of the law, there is no statutory 
requirement that a defect in a certification be merely “technical” to 
be correctable. Nor is there a statutory basis for finding a defective 
certification uncorrectable based on “intentional, reckless, or 
negligent disregard for the applicable certification requirements.” 
In reaching the opposite conclusion, the Board relied on the text of 
an unenacted version of the governing statute, which passed only in 
the Senate . . . . 
The statute, as enacted, mentions only “defective certification[s]” 
without reference to the technical nature of the defect or mens rea. It 
is axiomatic that a statute should not be read to implicitly include 
language specifically rejected by Congress . . . . We hold that 
§ 7103(b)(3) does not limit defects to those that are technical in nature 
nor does it limit a contractor’s right to correct a defect if the initial 
certification was made with “intentional, reckless, or negligent 
disregard for the applicable certification requirements.”71 
The Federal Circuit did not address the broader issue of whether 
certification is a jurisdictional requirement, avoiding any direct 
assertion that certification is or is not jurisdictional. 
The opinion concludes recognizing that, because the Contracting 
Officer admittedly did not issue her decision rejecting the claim for 
lack of certification until more than sixty days after the claim was 
submitted, the claim was deemed denied and therefore properly 
appealable to the Board: 
It is undisputed that the contracting officer failed to notify DAI of 
the defect within the statutory period. DAI submitted its claims on 
May 10, 2017 and did not receive notice of the defect until July 19, 
 
 67. See Opening Brief of Appellant at 16, 19, DAI Global, LLC v. Adm’r of the U.S. 
Agency for Int’l Dev., CBCA 5942, CBCA 5943, CBCA 5944, CBCA 5945, CBCA 5946, 
18-1 BCA ¶ 37,147. 
 68. See id. at 25–26 (citing Castellano, supra note 44, at 69–72). 
 69. DAI Global, 945 F.3d at 1197. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 1198–99 (internal citations omitted). 
2020]    2019 GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS LAW DECISIONS 1279 
 
2017, more than 60 days after DAI filed its claim. The contracting 
officer was therefore required to issue a decision on DAI’s claims. 
But the contracting officer failed to do so. Because the contracting 
officer failed to issue a decision within the statutory period, DAI’s 
claim was deemed denied and became appealable to the Board.72 
d. Implications 
It is worth emphasizing that contractors are best advised to closely 
abide by all CDA and FAR claim submission requirements. That said, 
there is much to be gained from decisions, like DAI Global, that rightly 
relax and simplify the CDA’s jurisdictional requirements, which are 
often used to justify dismissal of valid claims based on hyper-technical, 
nonprejudicial deviations from the CDA and FAR-prescribed procedures. 
As the Supreme Court has emphasized, jurisdictional tests should be as 
simple and predictable as possible.73 From that perspective, eliminating 
the distinction between “technical” and other defects that might arise in 
the claim certification process is a step in the right direction for the 
long-term success of the CDA as a dispute resolution vehicle. 
2. KBR: More Maropakis malarkey 
Secretary of the Army v. Kellogg Brown & Root Services, Inc. (“KBR”)74 is 
part of a long-running dispute regarding the allowability of certain 
private security contractor (PSC) costs that KBR incurred during 
performance of the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP).75 
Despite previously reimbursing PSC costs, the Army changed course, 
deemed the costs unallowable, and withheld $44 million from KBR’s 
outstanding invoices.76 The dispute traveled through a series of decisions 
by the ASBCA and the Federal Circuit, with KBR eventually filing an 
amended complaint at ASBCA alleging prior material breach: “KBR ‘is 
entitled to judgment because the Army breached its contractual 
obligation to provide adequate force protection and the use of PSCs 
was a permissible remedy.’”77 
 
 72. Id. at 1200 (internal citation omitted). 
 73. See Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 80 (2010). 
 74. 779 F. App’x 716 (2019). 
 75. See generally Ralph C. Nash, Helping the Government: It Can Be Troublesome, 33 
NASH & CIBINIC REP. NL ¶ 43, Aug. 2019. 
 76. Kellogg Brown & Root Servs., 779 F. App’x at 717. 
 77. Id. at 718. 
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The Army moved to dismiss this allegation for lack of jurisdiction on 
the basis that KBR had not submitted a CDA claim to the contracting 
officer alleging prior breach as a basis for relief,78 relying on the 
Federal Circuit’s controversial decision in M. Maropakis Carpentry, Inc. 
v. United States.79 Maropakis held that where a contractor asserts an 
argument seeking adjustment of contract terms or payment, even 
when asserted as an affirmative defense to a government claim, the 
contractor must first formally submit that argument as a claim to the 
contracting officer.80 The Federal Circuit extended Maropakis to 
government claims in Raytheon Co. v. United States,81 creating a 
jurisdictional bar against affirmative defenses asserted by the 
government that seek an adjustment to contract terms but were not 
first issued as formal contracting officer final decisions.82 
The Board denied the Army’s motion and granted summary 
judgment in KBR’s favor.83 With respect to jurisdiction, the Board 
applied prior Federal Circuit precedent from Laguna Construction Co. 
v. Carter,84 which held that the common law defense of prior material 
breach does not need to be presented as a CDA claim.85 Securiforce 
International America, LLC v. United States86 extends Laguna to confirm 
that a contractor’s common-law affirmative defense of prior material 
breach is not subject to the Maropakis rule.87 
On the merits, the Board held that the Army’s failure to provide adequate 
protection constituted a prior material breach, justifying the PSC costs: 
The government does not seriously dispute that it was obligated 
under the LOGCAP III contract to provide force protection to 
[KBR] and its subcontractors equivalent to that provided to DoD 
civilians, and obligated . . . to provide them with force protection 
commensurate with the threat. Indeed, it would be unconscionable 
to take the position that the contract prohibited [KBR] and its 
 
 78. Id. 
 79. 609 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 80. Id. at 1331. For comprehensive (and highly critical) analysis of Maropakis, see 
Steven L. Schooner & Pamela J. Kovacs, Affirmatively Inefficient Jurisprudence?: Confusing 
Contractors’ Rights to Raise Affirmative Defenses with Sovereign Immunity, 21 FED. CIR. B.J. 
685, 704–06 (2011). 
 81. 747 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
 82. Id. at 1353–55. 
 83. Kellogg Brown & Root Servs. Inc., ASBCA No. 56358, 17-1 BCA ¶ 36,779. 
 84. 828 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
 85. Id. at 1369–70. 
 86. 879 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 87. Id. at 1363. 
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subcontractors from providing for their own protection, while 
performing in a war zone, without otherwise providing for their 
security. Yet, despite the many and continuing failures of the 
government to provide the promised level of force protection to 
[KBR] and its subcontractors summarized above, the government 
seeks to disallow the PSC costs incurred . . . in order to accomplish 
their mission under the LOGCAP contract despite the government’s 
breach, and argues that its breach was not material. It is hard to 
imagine a contract breach more material than this one, which 
eviscerated the promise at the heart of the justification for the 
government’s claim. The government’s breach was material.88 
In the words of Professor Nash: “Believe it or not, the Government 
appealed this decision.”89 The Army repeated its argument that KBR’s 
prior material breach allegations should be dismissed for lack of 
jurisdiction.90 In a nonprecedential, unanimous decision authored by 
Judge Stoll and joined by Chief Judge Prost and Judge Lourie, the 
Federal Circuit affirmed.91 
The Federal Circuit agreed that Laguna controlled, and thus KBR’s 
prior material breach claim did not need to be submitted to the 
contracting officer as a certified claim.92 Although nonprecedential, the 
KBR decision offers helpful guidance through this complex area of law: 
Like the contractor in Securiforce and the government in Laguna, 
KBR asserts the affirmative defense of prior material breach under 
the contract as written. KBR hired PSCs only because the Army first 
breached its force protection obligations. So while the LOGCAP III 
contract prohibits the use of PSCs, the Army’s prior material breach 
excused KBR’s noncompliance with that prohibition. KBR’s options 
were to either cease operations or to hire PSCs; it chose the latter so 
that it could continue supporting the military. In Laguna, we held 
that the Board had jurisdiction over the government’s prior material 
breach defense under the contract as written, which the government 
asserted to defeat Laguna’s monetary claim. And more recently in 
Securiforce, we reiterated that such a defense “is not a claim for 
money” and need not be presented to the contracting officer. KBR 
asserts the same defense here. KBR’s prior material breach defense 
 
 88. Kellogg Brown & Root Servs. Inc., ASBCA No. 56358, 17-1 BCA ¶ 36,779. 
 89. Nash, supra note 75, at ¶ 43. 
 90. Sec’y of the Army v. Kellogg Brown & Root Servs., Inc., 779 F. App’x 716, 719 
(Fed. Cir. 2019). 
 91. Id. at 717. 
 92. Id. at 719–21. 
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seeks denial of the Army’s monetary claim to over $44 million, and 
the Board properly exercised jurisdiction.93 
The Federal Circuit found it irrelevant that, due to the posture of 
the dispute, KBR was technically seeking to recover funds already in 
the government’s possession: 
We recognize that the posture of this case differs from Laguna. The 
government in Laguna asserted its defense to withhold payment 
whereas KBR asserted its defense to recover payment. We 
nonetheless conclude that Laguna’s teachings apply here. The 
government pays the contractor for services performed, so monies 
at issue are necessarily in the hands of the government first. Whether 
prior material breach is asserted to eliminate debt as in Laguna, or 
to recover withheld payments as here, the effect is the same—the 
defense is asserted to defeat a wrongful monetary claim.94 
Finally, the Federal Circuit distinguished this case from Maropakis 
and Raytheon on the basis that KBR did not seek to adjust the terms of 
the contract: 
Contrary to what the Army argues, this case is not like Maropakis or 
Raytheon because KBR does not seek to adjust the terms of the 
contract. The contractor in Maropakis asserted excusable delay as an 
affirmative defense and sought a time extension for performance 
under the contract. Our conclusion that the Court of Federal Claims 
lacked jurisdiction turned on the fact that the contractor was seeking 
“an adjustment of contract terms.” Similarly, the government in 
Raytheon sought an equitable adjustment to the contract that was less 
than the dollar amount demanded by the contractor. Maropakis and 
Raytheon are thus distinguishable because the parties in those cases 
sought to change the terms of the contract and did not assert prior 
material breach as an affirmative defense. As mentioned above, KBR 
seeks only a denial of the government’s monetary claim, not a 
change to the terms of the contract.95 
This opinion’s nonprecedential status should not lull any party into 
thinking that the drama of Maropakis is finally settled. The case law 
stemming from Maropakis is notoriously complex, and it is still (a decade 
later) essentially impossible to predict which defenses do and do not need 
to be presented to a contracting officer in the form of a CDA claim. 
 
 
 93. Id. at 721 (internal citations omitted). 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
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3. HHL: Distinctions between requests for equitable adjustment and certified 
claims 
Hejran Hejrat Co. v. U.S. Army Corps. of Engineers,96 (“HHL”) addresses 
the requirement that, before a Request for Equitable Adjustment 
(REA) can qualify as a claim and provide the basis for CDA jurisdiction, 
the contractor must request a contracting officer’s decision on the 
claim and the contracting officer must issue a decision on that claim.97 
Amidst a dispute with the Army Corps of Engineers regarding 
contract price adjustments under a contract to provide transportation 
services in Afghanistan, Hejran Hejrat Co. LTD (“HHL”) submitted to 
the contracting officer a document titled “Request for Equitable 
Adjustment,” which requested compensation and stated that the 
document should be “treated as an REA.”98 The contracting officer 
denied the request in a writing characterized as the “Government’s 
final determination in this matter.”99 HHL appealed to the ASBCA, but 
the Board dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because, “[a]t no point, in 
six years of communication with [the agency], has HHL requested a 
contracting officer’s final decision.”100 There was apparently no dispute 
that HHL’s REA satisfied any other claim submission requirement.101 
In a unanimous opinion authored by Judge Dyk and joined by 
Judges Newman and Wallach, the Federal Circuit reversed and 
remanded to the Board for further proceedings.102 The Federal Circuit 
found that “there was a request for a final decision by a contracting 
officer and a final decision entered by the contracting officer . . . .”103 
First, the Federal Circuit squarely rejected the government’s 
suggestion that there was any jurisdictional significance to HHL styling 
its submission as an REA instead of a claim, citing a long line of Federal 
Circuit precedent recognizing that REAs may satisfy the claim 
submission requirements.104 Second, the Federal Circuit rejected the 
notion that HHL’s REA submission did not include language clearly 
 
 96. 930 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
 97. Id. at 1356. 
 98. Id. at 1356–57 (internal quotation and alteration omitted). 
 99. Id. at 1356. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 1357–58. 
 102. Id. at 1356. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 1357. 
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requesting a contracting officer’s decision, quoting prior precedent 
that the Federal Circuit is 
loathe to believe that in this case a reasonable contractor would 
submit to the contracting officer a letter containing a payment 
request after a dispute had arisen solely for the contracting officer’s 
information and without at the very least an implied request that the 
contracting officer make a decision as to entitlement. Any other 
finding offends logic.105 
Third, the Federal Circuit rejected the government’s argument that 
the HHL REA did not request a contracting officer’s final decision 
because prior HHL communications on the issue had expressly stated 
that they did not seek a contracting officer’s final decision.106 The Federal 
Circuit noted that, while prior correspondence may have expressly stated 
that no decision was requested, the ultimate REA did not include any such 
disclaimer, and postdated the earlier correspondence by more than a 
year.107 On this point, the Federal Circuit also found relevant that the REA 
“was sworn unlike earlier submissions, and thus had a formality lacking in 
the earlier submissions.”108 
C.   St. Bernard Parish: Punting the Rick’s Mushroom Problem 
St. Bernard Parish Government v. United States109 is significant because 
of the important issue the Federal Circuit avoided, leaving the Court 
of Federal Claims judges divided as to their jurisdiction over breach of 
contract disputes arising under cooperative agreements and other 
nonprocurement contracts. This issue grows more important as the 
government increasingly relies on nonprocurement contracts like 
cooperative agreements and so-called “Other Transactions.”110 
 
 
 105. Id. at 1358 (quoting Transamerica Ins. Corp. v. United States, 973 F.2d 1572, 
1578 (Fed. Cir. 1992), overruled in part by Reflectone, Inc. v. Dalton, 60 F.3d 1573, 1579 
n.10 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc)). 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. 916 F.3d 987 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
 110. See Nathaniel E. Castellano, “Other Transactions” Are Government Contracts, and Why 
It Matters, 48 PUB. CONT. L.J. 485, 486, 490, 499 (2019) (recognizing increased use of “Other 
Transactions” in lieu of procurement contracts, providing legal argument that Other 
Transactions are contracts with the government, and recognizing the jurisdiction risk 
created by Rick’s Mushroom to breach of contract claims arising from Other Transactions). 
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1. Context 
The Federal Circuit’s decision in Rick’s Mushroom Service Inc. v. United 
States111 creates uncertainty as to whether the Court of Federal Claims 
and the Federal Circuit will construe nonprocurement contracts (such 
as cooperative agreements and Other Transactions) to satisfy the 
“money mandating” requirement for Tucker Act jurisdiction.112 “The 
Tucker Act is merely a jurisdictional statute and does not create a 
substantive cause of action . . . ” and so, “the plaintiff must look beyond 
the Tucker Act to identify a substantive source of law that create[d] the 
right to recovery of money damages against the United States.”113 The 
Federal Circuit affirmed in Rick’s Mushroom the Court of Federal 
Claims’ dismissal for lack of jurisdiction of a plaintiff’s alleged breach 
of a cooperative agreement where the parties had agreed to a cost-
sharing arrangement. The opinion reasons that “the cost-share 
agreement does not provide a substantive right to recover money-
damages and Rick’s does not point to a money-mandating source of 
law to establish jurisdiction”114 This was a departure from the general 
rule that money damages are presumed an available and adequate 
remedy for breach of contract, and that therefore, a plaintiff need not 
identify any additional money mandating source of law when alleging 
breach of contract under the Tucker Act.115 
Applying Rick’s Mushroom, the Federal Circuit has reached the same 
conclusion with respect to the alleged breach of a confidentiality 
agreement with the government where there was no indication that a 
breach would entitle the plaintiff to money damages.116 Certain Court 
of Federal Claims decisions, including the decision on appeal in St. 
Bernard Parish, have relied on Rick’s Mushroom to conclude that 
nonprocurement contracts, particularly cooperative agreements, are 
not entitled to a presumption of money damages.117 
 
 111. 521 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 112. Id. at 1343–44. For (critical) analysis, see 3 KAREN L. MANOS, GOVERNMENT 
CONTRACT COSTS & PRICING § 90:6 (June 2019 update); Ralph C. Nash, Does the Implied 
Warranty of Specifications Attach to Cooperative Agreements?: A Surprising Answer, 22 NO. 12 
NASH & CIBINIC REP. ¶ 71, Dec. 2008. 
 113. Rick’s Mushroom Serv., Inc., 521 F.3d at 1343. 
 114. Id. 
 115. See LaBatte v. United States, 899 F.3d 1373, 1378–79 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (compiling cases). 
 116. See Higbie v. United States, 778 F.3d 990 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
 117. St. Bernard Par. Gov’t v. United States, 134 Fed. Cl. 730, 734–35 (2017), aff’d 
on other grounds, 916 F.3d 987 (Fed. Cir. 2019); see also Anchorage v. United States, 119 
Fed. Cl. 709, 713 (2015). 
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Yet, several Federal Circuit decisions have rejected government 
attempts to apply Rick’s Mushroom beyond the unique facts of that case, 
reaffirming the general presumption of money damages arising from 
a breach of contract—at least in the context of settlement 
agreements.118 And, at least one judge on the Court of Federal Claims 
has distinguished Rick’s Mushroom to find jurisdiction over alleged 
breach of cooperative agreement claims.119 While the appeal in St. 
Bernard Parish offered an opportunity to address this jurisdictional 
confusion, the Federal Circuit decided the case on other grounds. 
2. The Federal Circuit’s decision 
St. Bernard Parish involved a cooperative agreement between the 
Parish and the Emergency Watershed Protection Program office of the 
U.S. Department of Agriculture, which required the Parish to install 
emergency watershed protection measures to relieve hazards created 
by Hurricane Katrina at a cost not to exceed a fixed amount.120 After 
performance, a dispute arose as to the amount the government would 
pay, and the Parish sued for breach of contract in the Court of Federal 
Claims.121 Following Rick’s Mushroom, Court of Federal Claims Judge 
Damich concluded that the court lacked jurisdiction over a breach of 
contract claim arising from a cooperative agreement.122 
The Parish appealed. In a unanimous opinion authored by Judge 
Bryson and joined by Judges Lourie and Wallach, the Federal Circuit 
agreed that the Court of Federal Claims lacked jurisdiction, but 
avoided entirely the Rick’s Mushroom issue.123 Instead, the Federal 
 
 118. See LaBatte, 899 F.3d at 1378–79 (finding jurisdiction over breach of settlement 
agreement); Rocky Mountain Helium LLC v. United States, 841 F.3d 1320, 1326–27 
(Fed. Cir. 2016) (finding jurisdiction over breach of settlement agreement); Holmes 
v. United States, 657 F.3d 1303, 1311–12, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (finding jurisdiction 
over settlement agreement based on nexus to future employment). 
 119. See San Antonio Hous. Auth. v. United States, 143 Fed. Cl. 425, 463–64 (2019). 
 120. St. Bernard Par., 134 Fed. Cl. at 732–34 (2017). 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 734–35. Curiously, the Court of Federal Claims also concluded that it 
lacked jurisdiction due to lack of consideration on the basis that the contract did not 
“direct[ly] benefit” the government. Id. at 735–36. While it is true that cooperative 
agreements entail the government paying a private party to provide a benefit to a third 
party, it is not obvious why the government does not receive consideration when it enters 
into such a contract, i.e., it promises compensation in return for the consideration of the 
contractor delivering the promised benefit to the third party. See Ralph C. Nash, 
Cooperative Agreements: A Possible Remedy, 33 NASH & CIBINIC REP. NL ¶ 16, Mar. 2019. 
 123. St. Bernard Pari., 916 F.3d at 991–98. 
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Circuit reasoned that the particular program through which the 
cooperative agreement was established was created under a statutory 
authority that provided for district court jurisdiction over agency 
action under the program.124 While that holding may provide an 
answer to some cooperative agreement disputes, it leaves considerable 
uncertainty—and clear disagreement among the Court of Federal 
Claims judges—regarding Court of Federal Claims jurisdiction over 
breach of contract allegations arising from cooperative agreements 
and other nonprocurement contracts. 
D.   Significant Decisions With (Curious) Nonprecedential Designation 
Curiously, three of the Federal Circuit’s most significant 2019 
procurement decisions were designated as nonprecedential. The first, 
KBR (discussed above in the context of CDA jurisdiction) provided 
helpful analysis of the notoriously complex Maropakis line of decisions. 
Next, in American Relocation Connections, L.L.C. v. United States,125 a 
panel of three of the Federal Circuit’s most recently appointed judges 
provided useful (but nonprecedential) analysis of the prejudice 
requirement in bid protests.126 Finally, in Safeguard Base Operations, LLC 
v. United States,127 the Federal Circuit dismissed as moot an appeal that 
many in the procurement community hoped would be used to bring 
clarity to the standards that the Court of Federal Claims judges apply 
to Competition In Contracting Act (CICA) override challenges.128 
The Federal Circuit’s Rules and Internal Operating Procedures 
(IOPs) address the significance of nonprecedential designation. 
Pursuant to Federal Circuit Rule 32.1, parties “are not prohibited or 
restricted from citing nonprecedential dispositions issued after 
January 1, 2007,” and the “court may refer to a nonprecedential 
decision in an opinion or order and may look to a nonprecedential 
disposition for guidance or persuasive reasoning, but will not give one 
of its own nonprecedential dispositions the effect of binding 
precedent.”129 Nonprecedential designation can serve to effectively 
insulate a decision from en banc rehearing, as the Practice Notes to 
Federal Circuit Rule 35 warn that a “petition for rehearing en banc is 
 
 124. Id. at 992, 997–98. 
 125. 789 F. App’x 221 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
 126. Id. 
 127. 792 F. App’x 945 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
 128. Id. 
 129. Fed. Cir. R. 32.1(c)–(d). 
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rarely appropriate if the appeal was the subject of a nonprecedential 
opinion by the panel of judges that heard it.”130 Federal Circuit Rule 
32.1 does, however, provide a window of opportunity to petition that a 
nonprecedential opinion be redesignated as precedential.131 
IOP Number 10, provides the official justification for precedential 
and nonprecedential designations: 
2. The purpose of a precedential disposition is to inform the bar and 
interested persons other than the parties. The parties can be sufficiently 
informed of the court’s reasoning in a nonprecedential opinion. 
3. Disposition by nonprecedential opinion or order does not mean 
the case is considered unimportant, but only that a precedential 
opinion would not add significantly to the body of law or would 
otherwise fail to meet a criterion in paragraph 4.132 
IOP 10, Paragraph 4, lists circumstances that warrant precedential 
designation, including where an “issue of first impression is treated”; 
an “existing rule of law is criticized, clarified, altered, or modified”; an 
“existing rule of law is applied to facts significantly different from those 
to which that rule has previously been applied”; a “legal issue of 
substantial public interest, which the court has not sufficiently treated 
recently, is resolved”; and a “previously overlooked rule of law is 
treated.”133 Suffice it to say, the Author encounters some difficulty 
reconciling this list of justifications for precedential designation with 
the nonprecedential designations assigned to KBR, American Relocation 
Services, and SBO. Each case seems to satisfy at least one if not several 
of the IOP 10 criteria. 
1. American Relocation Services: A fresh take on prejudice 
American Relocation Services provides a refreshing and useful perspective 
for the bid protest prejudice requirement. 
a. Context for prejudice & the “substantial chance” standard 
The Federal Circuit and its predecessors (like the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO)) have long recognized that in order to 
succeed, a protester must show not only an error in the procurement 
process, but also that the protester suffered some prejudice as a result 
 
 130. Fed. Cir. R. 35 (Practice Notes). 
 131. Fed. Cir. R. 32.1(e). 
 132. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT INTERNAL 
OPERATING PROCEDURES, supra note 43, No. 10. 
 133. Id. 
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of that error. In the context of a post-award protest, the prejudice 
requirement is satisfied if the protester can demonstrate a “substantial 
chance” of receiving an award but for the procurement error.134 
The rationale for this substantial chance test was explored in Morgan 
Business Associates v. United States.135 The Court of Claims rejected the 
protester’s argument that any violation of procurement law 
necessitates a remedy, and also rejected the government’s argument that 
a protester is only entitled to a remedy if the protester can prove it would 
have received the contract but for the error.136 Striking a middle ground, 
the Court of Claims reasoned that a protester need only demonstrate a 
“substantial chance” of success but for the agency error: 
We reject, however, plaintiff’s proposition that any breach of the 
duty to give consideration creates an immediate entitlement to bid 
preparation costs. Morgan emphasizes that failure to consider its 
proposal was a violation of statute and procurement regulations, but 
we have said that “proven violation of pertinent statutes or 
regulations can, but need not necessarily, be a ground for recovery.” 
Acceptance of plaintiff’s theory would make the Government an 
insurer for a party’s bid preparation expenses whenever a bid or 
proposal is lost. This could lead to the far-fetched result that the 
Government might be responsible for paying bid preparation costs 
for a proposal that is wholly inadequate on its face, one which would 
be summarily rejected after even a single reading, or one which has 
no real chance of acceptance. Bid preparation expenses are a cost of 
doing business that are “lost” whenever the bidder fails to receive a 
contract. We cannot assume that a plaintiff has always and necessarily 
been damaged by the Government’s failure to consider its proposal—
but that is the end- result of the rule Morgan puts forward. 
Conversely, we are not persuaded by the Government’s 
argument that plaintiff must show that, but for the failure to 
consider its proposal, it would have received a contract. . . . [I]t 
would be virtually impossible for the plaintiff to make a “but for” 
showing. . . . 
We hold, rather, that when the Government completely fails to 
consider a plaintiff’s bid or proposal, the plaintiff may recover its bid 
preparation costs if, under all the facts and circumstances, it is 
established that, if the bid or proposal had been considered, there 
was a substantial chance that the plaintiff would receive an award—
 
 134. Statistica, Inc. v. Christopher, 102 F.3d 1577, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (quoting 
CACI, Inc.-Fed. v. United States, 719 F.2d 1567, 1574–75 (Fed. Cir. 1983)). 
 135. 619 F.2d 892 (Ct. Cl. 1980). 
 136. Id. at 895. 
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that it was within the zone of active consideration. If there was no 
substantial chance that plaintiff’s proposal would lead to an award, 
then the Government’s breach of duty did not damage plaintiff. In 
that situation a plaintiff cannot rightfully recover its bid preparation 
expenses. This principle of liability vindicates the bidder’s interest and 
right in having his bid considered while at the same time forestalling 
a windfall recovery for a bidder who was not in reality damaged.137 
Although subsequent opinions from different judges and different 
tribunals later employed slightly different formulations of the 
substantial chance test, the Federal Circuit confirmed in Statistica, Inc. 
v. Christopher138 that all of these variations ultimately require that “a 
protester must demonstrate that but for the alleged error, there was a 
‘substantial chance that [it] would receive an award—that it was within 
the zone of active consideration.’”139 While the phrases “substantial 
chance” and “zone of active consideration” were settled by Statistica, they 
have limited utility. The Court of Federal Claims is left with little practical 
guidance on where to draw the line between (1) prejudicial error that 
necessitates remand for further consideration (or other remedy) and (2) 
nonprejudicial error that does not warrant sustaining a protest. 
b. American Relocation Services: Framing protester prejudice 
through the APA 
In American Relocation Services, Judge Hughes authored a nonprecedential 
decision joined by Judges Reyna and Chen—three of the court’s most 
recent appointees140—that recited the generic rule for prejudice but then 
added a new gloss, emphasizing that the bid protest prejudice requirement 
is rooted in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) itself: 
We review bid protest cases according to the standards in 5 U.S.C. 
§ 706. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(4). Section 706 instructs courts that “due 
account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial error.” 5 U.S.C. 
§ 706. That rule calls on courts to apply the “same kind of ‘harmless-
error’ rule that courts ordinarily apply in civil cases.” See Shinseki v. 
Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 406 (2009) (discussing identical language in 
38 U.S.C. § 7261(b)(2) and noting that “Congress intended [that 
 
 137. Id. at 895–96 (internal footnotes and citations omitted). 
 138. 102 F.3d 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
 139. Id. at 1581 (alteration in original) (quoting CACI, Inc.-Fed. v. United States, 
719 F.2d 1567, 1574–75 (Fed. Cir. 1983)). 
 140. Seven of the Federal Circuit’s active judges were appointed during the Obama 
administration in a period spanning from 2010 through 2015. See Judges, U.S. CT. APPEALS 
FOR FED. CIR., http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/judges [https://perma.cc/ HK4K-AQDE]. 
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statute] . . . to ‘incorporate a reference’ to the APA’s approach”). 
Similarly, the federal harmless error statute instructs courts to 
disregard “errors or defects which do not affect the substantial rights 
of the parties.” 28 U.S.C. § 2111. “The correction of an error must 
yield a different result in order for that error to have been harmful 
and thus prejudice a substantial right of a party.” Munoz v. Strahm 
Farms, Inc., 69 F.3d 501, 504 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Thus, to prevail in its 
bid protest, ARC must “show a significant, prejudicial error in the 
procurement process,” meaning it must show that there is a greater-
than-insignificant chance that CBP would have issued the 2018 RFQ 
as a set-aside for small businesses had it not committed the alleged 
errors. Alfa Laval Separation, Inc., 175 F.3d at 1367.141 
The citations to Shinseki v. Sanders,142 the APA’s “harmless error” 
provision, and the federal “harmless error” statute are all 
noteworthy.143 In Sanders, the Supreme Court agreed that the Federal 
Circuit erred by effectively applying a presumption of prejudice in 
veterans benefits cases, as opposed to applying the case-by-case analysis 
generally required to assess harmless error under the APA and federal 
harmless error statute.144 American Relocation seems to suggest that the 
bid protest prejudice requirement must be applied based on 
consideration of the basic principles of APA review. This is consistent 
with the Court of Federal Claims’ modern source of bid protest 
jurisdiction, which expressly provides for APA review.145 
On one hand, the American Relocation analysis (like the Sanders 
decision) can be read in some cases to strengthen the prejudice 
requirement, permitting the Court of Federal Claims relatively broad 
authority (if not responsibility) to deny a protest where it is clear from 
the record that the protester would not have a substantial chance of 
receiving award, notwithstanding the alleged procurement error. On 
the other hand, the American Relocation analysis, if extended to its 
logical end, also reveals the limit of the Court of Federal Claims’ 
authority to disregard a procurement error as nonprejudicial. In the 
context of APA review, the harmless error rule is counterbalanced by 
 
 141. Am. Relocation Connections, L.L.C. v. United States, 789 F. App’x 221, 228 
(Fed. Cir. 2019). 
 142. 556 U.S. 396 (2009). 
 143. Judge Hughes served as counsel for the United States in Sanders, in his prior 
capacity as a Department of Justice attorney. Id. at 399. 
 144. Id. at 406–09, 412–13 (“In Sanders’ case, the Veterans Court found the notice 
error harmless. And after reviewing the record, we conclude that finding is lawful.”). 
 145. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(4) (2012); see also 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012). 
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another fundamental tenet of APA review, referred to as the Chenery 
doctrine.146 Under this doctrine, reviewing courts “may not supply a 
reasoned basis for the agency’s action that the agency itself has not 
given” and “must judge the propriety of such action solely by the 
grounds invoked by the agency.”147 
Although not precedential, the American Relocation Services analysis—
if properly extended to incorporate the Chenery doctrine as well as the 
harmless error rule—offers a useful framework to analyze bid protest 
prejudice issues. In some cases, like American Relocation, the record will 
make plain that the protester has no substantial chance of receiving 
award even if an alleged procurement error were remedied. In others, 
however, remedying the procurement error would necessarily change 
the evidence before the agency official vested with discretion to make 
the decision at issue.148 In such cases, the Chenery doctrine would seem 
to prevent the court from assuming the role of the agency 
decisionmaker and deciding whether the protester would have a 
substantial chance of award under the new circumstances. 
To be sure, there will not always be a clear line between cases where 
the rule of harmless error governs and those where the Chenery 
doctrine requires remand for a new first-instance decision. However, 
using the lens of the APA’s harmless error rule and the Chenery 
doctrine frames the prejudice question in more functional terms of 
administrative law, rooted in Supreme Court precedent with 
potentially persuasive authority generated from decades of APA 
 
 146. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943); see also Braniff Airways, Inc. v. 
Civil Aeronautics Bd., 379 F.2d 453, 465–66 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (“Of course an error 
cannot be dismissed as ‘harmless’ without taking into account the limited ability of a 
court to assume as a judicial function, even for the purpose of affirmance, the 
distinctive discretion assigned to the agency.” (citing Chenery, 332 U.S. at 196)); 33 
WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 8394 (2d ed., Aug. 2019 
Update) (discussing the balance between the harmless error rule affirmed in Sanders 
and the Chenery doctrine). 
 147. Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Ark.-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 285–86 (1974). 
 148. See, e.g., Centerra Grp., LLC v. United States, 138 Fed. Cl. 407, 421 (2018) 
(“The prejudice analysis in these circumstances acknowledges that a substantial 
chance of award to the protester exists even if the precise contours of the but-for world 
cannot be discerned.”); Patricio Enters., Inc., B-412740 et al., 2016 CPD ¶ 152 (Comp. 
Gen. May 26, 2016) (“[W]e have no basis—and we decline the agency’s invitation—to 
speculate about how the SSA would have viewed the relative merits of . . . proposals in 
light of a new, reasonable . . . evaluation; we cannot conclude that the agency’s source 
selection decision would not have proceeded differently . . . .”). 
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litigation in U.S. district courts and courts of appeal.149 Nor would 
employing these APA doctrines require discarding the longstanding 
Federal Circuit and Court of Federal Claims precedent applying the 
“substantial chance” standard. Rather, the harmless error rule and Chenery 
principle serve to help the Court of Federal Claims apply the substantial 
chance test: to discern between a protester with a substantial chance and 
a protester with an insubstantial chance and to distinguish between those 
within the zone of active consideration from those without. 
2. SBO: The Future of CICA Override Challenges 
The third and final of the Federal Circuit’s significant 
nonprecedential procurement decisions was Safeguard Base Operations, 
L.L.C. v. United States (“SBO”).150 Many in the procurement community 
anticipated the SBO decision as the Federal Circuit’s long-awaited 
opportunity to provide clarity and consistency to the standards that 
Court of Federal Claims judges apply when reviewing an agency 
decision to override the automatic CICA stay in response to a GAO 
protest.151 Instead of reaching the merits, however, the Federal Circuit 
dismissed the appeal as moot in a nonprecedential decision.152 
Notwithstanding the nonprecedential dismissal, there is much to learn 
from the case as to the likely future of CICA override challenges. 
a. Context for CICA override challenges 
CICA override challenges are a special flavor of bid protest litigation. 
One of the most significant features of CICA is the automatic stay. 
Assuming compliance with strict timeliness requirements, once GAO 
notifies an agency of a pre-award protest, the Agency may not make 
award until GAO resolves the protest.153 In the context of a post-award 
protest, the Agency must automatically stay performance of the 
protested contract award until the GAO protest is resolved.154 The 
potential impact of this stay on agency operations is limited by CICA’s 
 
 149. See generally Rationalizing Hard Look Review After the Fact, Note, 122 HARV. L. REV. 
1909 (2009). 
 150. 792 F. App’x 945 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
 151. See Daniel Seiden, Feds May Be Real Winners if Appeal Helps ‘Confused’ Contractors, 
BLOOMBERG L. (Nov. 4, 2019), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/federal-contracting/feds-
may-be-real-winners-if-appeal-helps-confused-contractors [https://perma.cc/RH8Z-7JDA]. 
 152. SBO, 792 F. App’x 945 at 946, 948. 
 153. 31 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(1) (2012). 
 154. § 3553(d)(3)(A). 
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requirement that GAO must issue its decision within 100 days from the 
date the protest is filed.155 Absent the automatic stay, successful 
protesters would often be denied a meaningful remedy unless they 
obtained a preliminary injunction from the Court of Federal Claims.156 
CICA provides that agencies may, in narrow circumstances, override 
the automatic stay and proceed with a procurement as the GAO protest 
process unfolds. For both pre- and post-award protests, override may 
be justified by “a written finding that urgent and compelling 
circumstances which significantly affect interests of the United States 
will not permit waiting for the decision.”157 For post-award protests, an 
additional basis for overriding the CICA stay exists where “performance 
of the contract is in the best interests of the United States.”158 These are 
referred to as the “best interests” and “urgent and compelling” standards 
for CICA stay overrides.159 The override decision is documented in a 
written Determination & Findings (D&F).160 
Other than stating these authorities for overriding a CICA stay, 
neither CICA nor the FAR give agencies meaningful guidance on the 
standards to consider when drafting a D&F to support a CICA override.161 
The primary guidance comes from Court of Federal Claims decisions. 
The Federal Circuit confirmed in RAMCOR Services Group, Inc. v. 
United States162 that the Court of Federal Claims has jurisdiction to 
decide a protester’s challenge to an override decision.163 Following 
RAMCOR, the Court of Federal Claims developed a complex and often 
conflicting body of case law addressing the legal standards used to 
review an override decision. The most prominent of these opinions 
came in 2006 from Reilly’s Wholesale Produce v. United States.164 
The Reilly’s opinion explained that, while “override decisions are, by 
nature, fact specific, it is possible to distill from the relevant cases a 
variety of factors that an agency must consider in making an override 
 
 155. § 3554(a)(1). 
 156. See, e.g., James W. Nelson, GAO-COCF Concurrent Bid Protest Jurisdiction: Are Two 
Fora Too Many?, 43 PUB. CONT. L.J. 587, 612 (2014). 
 157. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3553(c)(2)(A), 3553(d)(3)(C)(i)(I). 
 158. 31 U.S.C. § 3553(d)(3)(C). 
 159. See Kevin J. Wilkinson & John M. Page, CICA Stays Revisited: Keys to Successful 
Overrides, 66 A.F. L. REV. 135, 136 (2010). 
 160. Id. at 139 n.19. 
 161. See 33 C.F.R. § 33.104 (2018). 
 162. 185 F.3d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
 163. Id. at 1290–91. 
 164. 73 Fed. Cl. 705 (2006). 
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decision based upon urgent and compelling circumstances”165 The 
Reilly’s decision then identifies four factors for consideration: 
(i) whether significant adverse consequences will necessarily occur 
if the stay is not overridden; (ii) conversely, whether reasonable 
alternatives to the override exist that would adequately address the 
circumstances presented; (iii) how the potential cost of proceeding 
with the override, including the costs associated with the potential that 
the GAO might sustain the protest, compare to the benefits associated 
with the approach being considered for addressing the agency’s 
needs; and (iv) the impact of the override on competition and the 
integrity of the procurement system, as reflected in the [CICA].166 
While almost any CICA override challenge will likely address Reilly’s 
to some extent, the Court of Federal Claims judges are divided on 
many critical aspects of how those factors should be applied, if at all.167 
Some decisions hold that an agency’s failure to fully consider and 
address even one of the Reilly’s factors is arbitrary.168 Some reject Reilly’s 
altogether, finding that the only appropriate standard is the APA’s 
general arbitrary and capricious standard of review and declining to 
require agencies to address any specific element in the override 
D&F.169 Others engage with the Reilly’s analysis but decide the case 
more broadly in terms of the general APA standard.170 The decisions 
are also divided as to whether the Reilly’s factors are limited to overrides 
invoking “urgent and compelling” circumstances or whether they 
extend to overrides that invoke a “best interests” justification.171 Finally, 
the decisions are divided as to whether a plaintiff has to separately 
 
 165. Id. at 711. 
 166. Id. (internal citations and footnote omitted). 
 167. Several articles from agency counsel and the private bar highlight and attempt 
to grapple with the consequences of this evolving and conflicting body of case law. See, 
e.g., Cameron S. Hamrick & Michelle E. Litteken, CICA Stay Overrides at the Court of 
Federal Claims: What Government Contractors Need to Know, 43 PUB. CONT. L.J. 687, 693–
702 (2014); Kevin J. Wilkinson & Dennis C. Ehlers, Ensuring CICA Stay Overrides Are 
Reasonable, Supportable, and Less Vulnerable to Attack: Practical Recommendations in Light of 
Recent COFC Cases, 60 A.F. L. REV. 91 (2007); Wilkinson & Page, supra note 159, at 138–
42. 
 168. See Nortel Gov’t Sols., Inc. v. United States, 84 Fed. Cl. 243, 247–48 (2008). 
 169. See Dyncorp Int’l LLC v. United States, 113 Fed. Cl. 298, 302 & n.4 (2013); Frontline 
Healthcare Workers Safety Found., Ltd. v. United States, No. 10-17C, 2010 WL 637790 (Fed. 
Cl. Feb. 4, 2010); PlanetSpace Inc. v. United States, 86 Fed. Cl. 566, 567–68 (2009). 
 170. See The Analysis Grp., LLC v. United States, No. 09-542C, 2009 WL 3747171, at 
*2–3 (Fed. Cl. Nov. 5, 2009). 
 171. See PMTech, Inc. v. United States, 95 Fed. Cl. 330, 344–45 (2010). 
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prove entitlement to injunctive relief in order to overturn the stay, or 
whether defeating the override under the Reilly’s test is adequate to 
restore the stay.172 
This conflicting body of case law leaves agencies and protesters in a 
tough position. It is difficult (if not impossible) to anticipate what 
standards will apply in an override challenge, at least until a Court of 
Federal Claims judge is assigned to the case. Even then, not every judge 
will have published a definitive position on each issue relevant to a 
CICA override challenge. This often requires that parties to override 
litigation must brief their (likely expedited) case against multiple 
alternative standards. As Professor Schooner noted in 2012: 
We would prefer to see the Court of Federal Claims inject certainty 
and consistency into the procurement process. And we share the 
frustration of those who complain that, all too often, the luck of the 
draw at the Court of Federal Claims significantly affects a case’s 
outcome. Absent intervention by the Federal Circuit, however, the lack 
of clarity surrounding the relevant standard will persist. This is 
particularly problematic to the extent that nothing in FAR 33.104(c) or 
(d) prepares a [Contracting Officer or a Head of Contracting Activity] 
for the requirements currently being imposed by the reviewing court.173 
With this context, it is not surprising that many in the procurement 
community have long anticipated that the Federal Circuit would weigh 
in and add some clarity. 
b. The SBO protest, appeal, & dismissal 
Safeguard Base Operations, LLC filed a protest at GAO in 
September 2018, challenging a Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) contract award.174 DHS overrode the CICA stay, and Safeguard 
filed suit in October 2018 at the Court of Federal Claims seeking a 
temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction setting aside 
the CICA stay override.175 By the end of October 2018, the Court of 
 
 172. See, e.g., Supreme Foodservice GmbH v. United States, 109 Fed. Cl. 369, 396–
97 (2013); Superior Helicopter LLC v. United States, 78 Fed. Cl. 181, 194 (2007); 
Reilly’s Wholesale Produce v. United States, 73 Fed. Cl. 705, 708–09 n.7 (2006). 
 173. See Steven L. Schooner, Postscript III: Challenging an Override of a Protest Stay, 26 
NO. 5 NASH & CIBINIC REP. ¶ 25 (May 2012). 
 174. See Safeguard Base Operations, LLC v. United States, 792 F. App’x 945, 946 
(Fed. Cir. 2019). 
 175. Id. at 946–47. 
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Federal Claims denied Safeguard’s motions.176 By decision issued 
December 14, 2018, GAO denied Safeguard’s protest.177 
Safeguard appealed, arguing that the Court of Federal Claims 
should have strictly applied the Reilly’s factors.178 Almost a full year after 
GAO denied Safeguard’s initial protest, on December 13, 2019, the 
Federal Circuit dismissed Safeguard’s appeal as moot in a 
nonprecedential decision.179 Judge Lourie authored the unanimous 
decision, joined by Judges Moore and Chen.180 
The panel agreed with the Government and the awardee that 
“Safeguard’s appeal is now moot because the GAO has denied its bid 
protest, and that decision would have terminated the CICA stay even 
in the absence of DHS’s override.”181 The panel rejected Safeguard’s 
argument that deciding the CICA override issues could impact 
Safeguard’s separate appeal from the Court of Federal Claim’s 
decision denying the merits of Safeguard’s protest.182 The panel also 
rejected the argument that Safeguard’s appeal qualified for the narrow 
mootness exception for issues “capable of repetition, yet evading 
review.”183 Rejecting Safeguard’s attempted analogy to the Supreme 
Court’s mootness analysis in Kingdomware Technologies, Inc. v. United 
States,184 the panel described the attenuated chain of events that would 
need to occur for Safeguard’s CICA override challenge to repeat itself: 
[W]e conclude that Safeguard has not demonstrated a controversy 
“capable of repetition, yet evading review.” This exception is 
applicable “‘only in exceptional situations,’ where (1) ‘the 
challenged action [is] in its duration too short to be fully litigated 
prior to cessation or expiration,’ and (2) ‘there [is] a reasonable 
expectation that the same complaining party [will] be subject to the 
same action again.’”185 
A comparison with Kingdomware is illustrative. There, the 
Supreme Court held that the petitioner, a bid protester that had bid 
on a Department of Veterans Affairs contract since performed, 
 
 176. Id. at 947. 
 177. Id. at 947 n.1. 
 178. Id. at 948. 
 179. Id. at 949. 
 180. Id. at 946. 
 181. Id. at 947. 
 182. See id. at 948. 
 183. Id. 
 184. 136 S. Ct. 1969 (2016). 
 185. Id. at 1976. 
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presented a controversy evading review when it argued that it was 
deprived of the contract because the VA misinterpreted 38 U.S.C. 
§ 8127(d) (mandating use of the “Rule of Two”) to not apply to 
certain contracts. While the contract at issue had already been 
performed, the Court reasoned that the case was not moot because 
the time period of performance was “too short to complete judicial 
review,” and “it [was] reasonable to expect that the [VA] [would] 
refuse to apply the Rule of Two” in the future and that 
Kingdomware, as a frequent contractor, would be reasonably likely 
to win a contract in the future if its view of the statute prevailed. 
. . . Safeguard—which has never received a federal 
contract[186]—would have to submit another unsuccessful bid, file a 
GAO protest, and suffer another CICA stay override. Moreover, 
Safeguard would have to show that the CICA stay override occurred 
because the agency was not required to justify its decision in light of 
the Reilly’s factors.187 
The decision couches its holding on the panel’s finding that: 
“Safeguard has not shown a reasonable likelihood that it will be subject 
to the same action again, and thus it has not presented an exceptional 
situation justifying invocation of the ‘capable of repetition yet evading 
review’ exception to mootness.”188 
Although nonprecedential, the SBO decision does speak to the 
standard of review applicable to CICA override challenges. Specifically, 
the panel decision includes language that seems to cast doubt on the 
idea that agencies must address the Reilly’s factors to justify an override, 
or that the Court of Federal Claims must apply the Reilly’s framework.189 
Instead, the SBO opinion seems to reaffirm that the Court of Federal 
Claims reviews protests through the APA’s general arbitrary and 
capricious standard.190 In doing so, the decision cites Federal Circuit 
precedent for the proposition that Court of Federal Claims decisions 
are not binding in future Court of Federal Claims cases.191 It also cites 
the Federal Circuit’s recent decision in Dell Federal Systems v. United 
States,192 which rejected the Court of Federal Claims’ application of a 
 
 186. As discussed at length during the oral argument, the protester was a joint venture. 
 187. SBO, 792 F. App’x at 948 (internal citations omitted). 
 188. Id. at 949. 
 189. Id. at 948–49. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. at 948. 
 192. 906 F.3d 982 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
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heightened “narrow targeting” standard when reviewing corrective 
action protests: 
We note that the Reilly’s factors do not even bind the Claims Court, 
AINS, Inc. v. United States, 365 F.3d 1333, 1336 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2004), 
abrogated on other grounds by Slattery v. United States, 635 F.3d 1298 
(Fed. Cir. 2011), let alone comprise an indispensable aspect of an 
agency rational basis. Cf. Dell Fed. Sys., L.P. v. United States, 906 F.3d 
982, 992 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (holding that “highly deferential” rational 
basis test governed Claims Court review of agency action for 
purposes of deciding injunctive relief in protest of bid 
reopening).193 
c. Implications 
SBO implicitly suggests that the Federal Circuit may never decide the 
merits of an appeal from a Court of Federal Claims’ override decision. 
Although perhaps conceivable through some series of emergency 
and/or interlocutory motions for stay pending appeal, expedited 
proceedings, petition for writ of mandamus, etc., it is difficult to 
conceive of a realistic circumstance where the Federal Circuit could 
receive full briefing and decide an appeal of a Court of Federal Claims’ 
decision in a CICA override challenge before the 100-day GAO protest 
deadline expires. As noted, the Federal Circuit’s opinion in SBO came 
almost a full year after GAO denied Safeguard’s protest. Even that 
outcome was relatively quick, as the Federal Circuit’s own statistics 
reflect that the median time for deciding an appeal reached fifteen 
months in Fiscal Year 2019.194 That being said, because SBO is designated 
as nonprecedential and rests on somewhat fact-specific mootness 
findings, a future panel could disagree with or distinguish the SBO 
decision and find that the appeal of a CICA override challenge does pass 
the mootness bar, perhaps as capable of repetition yet evading review. 
Assuming the Federal Circuit does not provide binding guidance to 
clarify the standards that apply to CICA override challenges, the 
default rule seems to be that any given override challenge will be 
decided largely at the discretion of the assigned Court of Federal 
Claims judge. As discussed above, many of those judges have expressed 
 
 193. SBO, 792 F. App’x at 948–49. 
 194. Median Disposition Time Cases Decided by Merits Panels, U.S. CT. APPEALS FOR FED. 
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differing views on important issues relevant to CICA overrides.195 
Accordingly, the safest practice for practitioners (agency counsel and 
the private bar) is often to take a conservative approach and cover all 
bases when preparing a D&F or motions for temporary restraining 
order and preliminary injunction.196 That may require addressing 
alternative standards for several issues, particularly if the assigned 
judge has not issued a definitive position on any given CICA override 
issue. And, notwithstanding what any Court of Federal Claims judge 
has decided in the past, parties should be prepared to grapple with the 
SBO panel’s commentary regarding the nonbinding nature of Reilly’s 
and the significance of the Dell Federal Systems decision. 
At bottom, SBO may not have been the precedential guidance that 
some in the procurement community hoped would finally unify and 
clarify the standards applicable to CICA override challenges. The 
decision, however, does offer several important insights regarding the 
future of CICA override challenges. 
CONCLUSION 
The Federal Circuit continued to play a significant role in shaping 
procurement law in 2019. It remains important for practitioners to 
keep a watchful eye on the Federal Circuit’s docket and carefully read 
its decisions. The Author has no doubt that will remain just as good 
advice in the 2020s as it was in the 2010s. 
 
 195. See supra notes 163–71 and accompanying text. 
 196. See Wilkinson & Page, supra note 159, at 154 (“The Court of Federal Claims 
jurisprudence in CICA stay override cases remains unsettled. The prudent approach 
in deciding whether to override a stay would be to (1) start with the four APA factors, 
(2) because the ‘Reilly’s factors’ still linger, agencies must consider them, and, (3) 
because the courts are mixed on whether injunctive relief or declaratory relief is 
necessary, agencies have to consider that the court will apply the four factors for 
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